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Abstract
Psychology and neuroscience have a long-standing tradition of studying blind individuals to investigate how visual
experience shapes perception of the external world. Here, we study how blind people experience their own body by
exposing them to a multisensory body illusion: the somatic rubber hand illusion. In this illusion, healthy blindfolded
participants experience that they are touching their own right hand with their left index finger, when in fact they are
touching a rubber hand with their left index finger while the experimenter touches their right hand in a synchronized
manner (Ehrsson et al. 2005). We compared the strength of this illusion in a group of blind individuals (n = 10), all of whom
had experienced severe visual impairment or complete blindness from birth, and a group of age-matched blindfolded
sighted participants (n = 12). The illusion was quantified subjectively using questionnaires and behaviorally by asking
participants to point to the felt location of the right hand. The results showed that the sighted participants experienced
a strong illusion, whereas the blind participants experienced no illusion at all, a difference that was evident in both tests
employed. A further experiment testing the participants’ basic ability to localize the right hand in space without vision
(proprioception) revealed no difference between the two groups. Taken together, these results suggest that blind
individuals with impaired visual development have a more veridical percept of self-touch and a less flexible and dynamic
representation of their own body in space compared to sighted individuals. We speculate that the multisensory brain
systems that re-map somatosensory signals onto external reference frames are less developed in blind individuals and
therefore do not allow efficient fusion of tactile and proprioceptive signals from the two upper limbs into a single illusory
experience of self-touch as in sighted individuals.
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Introduction
The classical question of how blind people experience the
external world in terms of space and the shape of objects has
attracted much attention from philosophers, psychologists, and
neuroscientists through the centuries [1–7]. An extensive body of
literature describes our substantial knowledge about these ques-
tions and information about the effects of visual deprivation on
tactile [8] and auditory perception [9–11] and on the development
of multisensory brain systems [12,13]. In general, when the brain
receives no visual input, this leads not only to changes in the visual
system [14,15] but also to the structural and functional re-
organization of brain regions that support other sensory modalities
and areas that mediate the integration of information across these
modalities [8,9,12,16]. This brain plasticity is associated with
behavioral changes that are related to how blind individuals use
sensory information from the intact senses to build representations
of external space to localize tactile and auditory cues [17,18].
Visual experience during the early years of life is crucial for the
development of multisensory integration mechanisms [12,13,19].
Congenitally blind individuals have been reported to exhibit more
extensive behavioral [17,18,20] and neuronal changes [21–23]
compared with individuals who had full vision during childhood.
The long-standing tradition of studying how visual experience
shapes the perception of the external world contrasts with the lack
of studies investigating how blind individuals experience their own
body. Given that blind people have an intact somatosensory
system, a perfectly reasonable argument could be that they should
be able to perceive their own body just as sighted individuals do.
However, the experience of our body in space does not depend
only on the somatosensory system, as there exists no unique set of
peripheral receptors that inform the brain about the location or
self-identity of body parts. The spatial experience of our own body
must therefore be constructed within the central nervous system by
the integration of somatosensory signals (from skin receptors,
muscle stretch receptors, joint receptors, etc.) [24–30], visual input
[31–35], auditory signals [36], vestibular cues [37,38], and stored
information related to prior experiences of the body (memory)
[31,39]. If, however, the lack of visual input is sufficient to change
the multisensory representations of the spatial properties of objects
in the external world, then is it possible that visual deprivation may
also influence the multisensory representation of one’s own body?
In this study, we used a perceptual illusion – the ‘‘somatic’’
rubber hand illusion [40] – to compare the multisensory
representation of the body in blind and sighted individuals. Over
the last decade, the rubber hand illusion has become a popular
tool to study how we experience ownership of our limbs and the
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underlying multisensory representation of the body [41–47]. In
our non-visual version of the rubber hand illusion [40], the
investigator moves the blindfolded participant’s left index finger so
that it touches the knuckle of a rubber right hand; at the same
time, the investigator touches the participant’s right hand on the
knuckle at the corresponding site. After 10 to 15 seconds of these
repetitive and synchronous touches [40], most participants start to
experience that they are touching their own right hand directly
with their left index finger [40]. It has been suggested that this
illusion is elicited as a consequence of the brain’s attempt to resolve
the conflicting tactile and proprioceptive information from the two
fingers [40]. The dynamic tactile and proprioceptive information
derived from the left index finger correlates with the touches
sensed on the right knuckle. This correlation leads to a recalibra-
tion of the perceived location of the right hand so that it feels closer
to the left hand [40], and consequently, a unitary percept of the
left index finger directly touching the participant’s right hand is
experienced [40]. It has been proposed that this perceptual fusion
requires the re-mapping of the touch sensation into a common
external reference frame in space near the hands [40,48,49].
Consistent with this idea and with data obtained from the original
visual version of this illusion [34], the somatic rubber hand illusion
is associated with increased activity in the premotor and
intraparietal cortices [40], areas that are known to be involved
in multisensory integration and encoding of visual and somatic
signals in external body-part-centered coordinates [50–57].
In this report, we describe what is, to the best of our knowledge,
the first investigation of a body illusion in blind individuals. We
compared the strength of the somatic rubber hand illusion in
a group of blind individuals, all of whom had experienced severe
visual impairment or complete blindness from birth, and a group
of age-matched blindfolded sighted participants. We quantified the
illusion using subjective reports in the form of questionnaires and
behavioral data in the form of inaccurate reaching in a pointing
task when asked to indicate the position of the right hand. We
hypothesized that blind individuals would experience a weaker
illusion of touching their own hand because impaired develop-
mental vision should lead to a functional and structural
reorganization of multisensory brain circuits, presumably in-
cluding those that support multisensory body perception. Further-
more, behavioral studies have shown that congenitally blind
individuals do not re-map somatosensory signals in external
coordinates [17,18] as sighted individuals do [58,59]. This suggests
a reduced remapping of somatosensory signals to coordinate
systems used to encode the space near the body, which are likely to
be modulated by vision. Thus, when exposed to the somatic
rubber hand illusion, we expected that blind individuals would not
perceptually fuse the tactile and proprioceptive signals from their
two hands into a single illusory multisensory percept of their own
two hands being in direct physical contact as sighted individuals
do. However, a weaker illusion in the blind participants could also
potentially be explained by their superior ability to localize their
hands in space (proprioception) due to sensory compensation and
cross-modal plasticity mechanisms [9,16] within the propriocep-
tive system. To control for this possibility, we used an established
bimanual matching task to assess the two groups’ ability to
perceive the location of their right hand in a horizontal plane
(without vision) [60].
Our results show that the blind participants were less susceptible
to the somatic rubber hand illusion compared to the sighted
participants, who reported a significant illusion. Importantly, this
difference could not be explained in terms of differences in basic
proprioceptive ability, as both groups showed similar accuracy in
localizing their hand in space. Thus, our results suggest
a fundamental difference in the ways that blind and sighted
individuals construct a central representation of their own body
and identify their own limbs by touch.
Methods
Participants
Ten blind (9 female) and twelve sighted (8 female) participants
took part in this study. The inclusion criterion for the blind group
was complete blindness or severe visual impairment without the
ability to see contour or movement. The ability to see light and
dark was allowed. The data on the type of visual impairment and
number of years without vision are presented in Table 1. Five
participants were congenitally blind, and five had been severely
visually impaired throughout development and had only been able
to see contours or light/dark differences prior to losing their vision
completely. All of the sighted volunteers had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. Both the blind and sighted participants were
healthy and spoke Swedish or English, and the participants in the
two groups were age matched. The mean ages for the blind and
sighted participants were 46.8614.8 years and 43.8617.2 years,
respectively. All of the participants gave their informed consent
prior to their participation in these experiments. These studies
were approved by the Regional Ethical Review Board of
Stockholm.
General experimental procedures for rubber hand
experiments #1 and #2
Before the actual experiment commenced, the participants were
verbally informed about the experimental setup. The participants
were given detailed instructions about how to place their hands on
the table and were informed that they would be touching a rubber
hand. In addition, prior to the experiment, the sighted individuals
were allowed to look at and touch the rubber hand, and the blind
participants were instructed to manually explore the model hand
with both hands. Thus, both groups received identical knowledge
about the experimental setup and could somatically recognize that
they were touching a rubber hand. This setup mirrors the original
visual version of the rubber hand illusion, in which the participants
had knowledge of the experimental setup and could visually
identify the rubber hand.
During the actual experiments, the participants sat with their
arms resting on a table in a pronated position (palms down,
Figure 1a). The sighted volunteers were blindfolded for the
duration of the experiment. All of the participants were allowed to
make small adjustments in the posture of their arms on the
tabletop to ensure that they were sitting comfortably and did not
have to move their arms during the stimulation periods. A life-
sized cosmetic prosthetic male or female right hand (gender-
matched) filled with hard plastic was placed on the table between
the participant’s hands, parallel with the participant’s right hand.
The distance between the participant’s right index finger and the
index finger of the rubber hand was always 15 cm.
The participants, the experimenter, and the rubber hand all
wore identical plastic surgical gloves to make the tactile surfaces of
the hands as similar as possible. The experimenter held the
participant’s left index finger in a steady grip between the index
finger and thumb throughout the entire stroking session, taking
care not to change the position of her fingers and to provide the
most consistent somatosensory stimulation possible (by not
touching any other part of the hand). The participant’s lower
left arm and hand rested on the table; i.e., he or she did not have
to lift the left hand during the stroking sessions. Furthermore, the
participant loosely bent all of the fingers of his or her left hand
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except for the index finger so that the fingers were not in the way
of the experimenter’s hand or the moving index finger. This
configuration ensured that the participants would not accidently
touch the rubber hand with any other digits or parts of their left
hand.
Using this approach, the experimenter moved the participant’s
left index finger so that it stroked the index finger of the rubber
hand. She also stroked the participant’s right index finger either in
synchrony (experimental condition) or temporal asynchrony
(control condition) (Figure 1a). Each stroke was 3–5 cm long and
applied in proximal-to-distal or distal-to-proximal directions,
always passing at least one joint (metacarpophalangeal or proximal
interphalangeal), for approximately one second. The stroke
direction alternated in a quasi-randomized way, and the
participant’s and the experimenter’s index fingers were lifted after
each stroke. The period between the strokes was approximately
one second. In the asynchronous condition, the strokes were
applied in an alternating fashion so that when the participant’s left
index finger touched the rubber hand, no tactile stimulation was
delivered to the participant’s right index finger, and vice versa.
Each stroking session lasted 60 seconds. The experimenter was
trained extensively during pilot testing to deliver these touches as
consistently as possible with respect to synchronicity, force,
duration and frequency.
Experimental design
Experiment #1: Questionnaire data. The participants
were exposed to two stroking sessions of synchronous or
asynchronous stimulation, each of which lasted 60 seconds. At
the end of each session, the participants were asked to complete
a verbally administered questionnaire in which they had to rate
their experience of five possible perceptual effects using a seven-
point Likert scale, ranging from ‘23’ (I disagree very strongly) to
‘+3’ (I agree very strongly), with ‘0’ indicating ‘‘I am uncertain.’’
One statement was designed to capture the illusory experience of
touching one’s own hand, and the other four served as controls for
suggestibility and task compliance (Figure 2).
Experiment #2: Proprioceptive drift. This experiment
consisted of 6 stroking sessions (3 synchronous and 3
asynchronous), each lasting 60 seconds. Immediately before and
after the sessions, the participants were required to point with their
left index finger towards their right index finger (Fig. 1b). A 70-cm-
long scale and a measuring tape were placed on the table 10 cm in
front of the participant’s right hand. The scale was oriented at a 90-
Table 1. Detailed data on the visual impairments observed in the blind group.
Participant (gender,
age) Current vision Past vision Blind at what age
Years without
vision Visual impairment
No. 1 (f, 48) - Light/dark 2,5 45,5 Retinitis pigmentosa
No. 2 (f, 60) - Contours 26 34 Retina
No. 3 (f, 47) Light/dark - Congenitally 47 Retina + optic nerve
No. 4 (f, 66) - 10% 48 18 Retinitis pigmentosa
No. 5 (f, 23) - - Congenitally 23 Retinitis pigmentosa
No. 6 (f, 44) Light/dark - Congenitally 44 Retinopathy
No. 7 (f, 46) Light/dark - Congenitally 46 Retinopathy
No. 8 (f, 64) - 2/10 49 15 Retinitis pigmentosa
No. 9 (m, 54) - Contours 16 38 Glaucoma + Retina
No. 10 (f, 20) - - Congenitally 20 Retinitis pigmentosa
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035912.t001
Figure 1. A. The setup used to induce the somatic rubber hand illusion. The experimenter moves the blindfolded participant’s left index finger so
that it touches the rubber right hand while simultaneously touching the corresponding site on the participant’s right hand. B. The procedure used to
register the proprioceptive drift as an objective measure of the illusion (Experiment #2). The participant indicates the felt location of the right index
finger by moving the left index finger along a ruler. C. The procedure used to measure the basic ability to locate the right index finger in space
(proprioception; Experiment #3). The blindfolded participants indicate the felt location of the right index finger resting on the tabletop by moving
the left hand under the table to match the positions of both index fingers. The position of the left index finger under the table is registered with
a transmitter and the Polhemus Fastrak Magnetic motion-capturing system (see Methods).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035912.g001
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degree angle with respect to the participant’s right hand. The
participant was asked to place his or her left index finger on the
scale and slide it in a single brisk movement towards the felt
position of the right index finger. The pointing error, i.e., the drift
of the felt position of the right hand from its actual position, was
calculated as the difference in pointing before and after the
stroking sessions. The crucial test of the illusion was to compare
the pointing error during the synchronous and asynchronous
conditions and to look for significantly greater drift towards the
rubber hand in the synchronous condition [40]. This
proprioceptive drift measure has previously been used as an
index of the rubber hand illusion [41] (for a recent critical review
of the limitations of the drift measure, see [61]). Between each
session, the participant was given a short break of 30 seconds and
was asked to move his or her right arm and hand. The rationale
for this break was to eliminate any potential illusory perception
and to exclude any possible carry-over effects.
Experiment #3: Finger localization task to test
proprioception. In this experiment, the participants were
seated at a table where the right hand was placed on top of the
table and the left hand below the tabletop. Small pieces of
cardboard, each the size of a fingertip, were glued onto the table
top at the following x and y coordinates, where the origin of the
coordinate system was the upper left corner of the table: (i)
30.00 cm617.00 cm; (ii) 14.00 cm631.50 cm; (iii)
26.00 cm651.00 cm. The participants were required to place
the tip of their right index finger on one of the three marked
locations and to match its position as accurately as possible with
the tip of their left index finger beneath the table top (Figure 1c).
The participants were allowed to take their time to find the correct
position. Whenever they verbally reported that the two index
fingers were placed directly on top of each other, the position of
the receiver at the tip of the left index finger was recorded.
Between every trial, the participants placed their hands in the
starting positions at the corners of the table, with the left hand
positioned under the table and the right hand placed on top of the
table. The participants were asked not to move their body with
respect to the chair, which was also monitored by the
experimenter.
Proprioceptive accuracy was measured fifteen times at each
location; the order of the trials was quasi-randomized and was the
same for all participants. The measurements were performed with
the Polhemus Fastrak Magnetic motion-capturing system (http://
www.polhemus.com/). This system consists of a transmitter, which
was fixed at the upper left corner of the table, i.e., at the origin of
the coordinate system. The motion-capturing system transmits
a magnetic field to register the position of the receiver, which was
positioned on the tip of the participant’s left index finger. The
distance from the transmitter to the receiver was measured in
centimeters along the x– and y-axes of the coordinate system. The
accuracy of the receiver in the workspace was 0.8 mm.
Order of experiments and post-experiment interviews
Experiment #2 (proprioceptive drift) was always conducted
before Experiment #1 (questionnaire) to prevent the participants
from guessing the specific purposes of the objective measures on
the basis of the questionnaire statements in Experiment #1.
Experiment #3, the bimanual finger localization task, was always
conducted last, as it required a different setup than the two rubber
hand illusion experiments. The blind and sighted groups were
tested in the same run of experiments, using an identical
experimental setup with the same experimenter.
At the end of the last experiment, we interviewed the
participants about their subjective experiences. The participants
were asked to describe their experiences during the testing
conditions, their experiences with their hands, and how and
where they had sensed the touches. In addition, the participants
were debriefed about the illusion and the most common illusory
percepts associated with it, and were asked to compare those to
their own experiences.
Statistical analysis
We used two hypothesis-driven statistical analyses. First, we
tested for a significant difference in the strength of the illusion
between the two groups. To test this, the two groups were compared
in a mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with group (blind vs.
sighted) as a between-subjects factor (experiment #2). In
experiment #1, the data were not normally distributed (e.g., most
blind individuals gave a rating of 23 on the illusion statement).
Therefore, we used non-parametric tests to directly compare the
rated strength of the illusion between the groups. Second, we
tested for the presence of the illusion within each group in a planned
comparison approach using t-tests (or equivalent non-parametric
tests). In all tests, we defined a significant p value as p,0.05 (two-
tailed).
Results
Experiment #1: Questionnaire data
The questionnaire data showed that 67% (8 out of 12) of the
sighted participants affirmed the illusion of touching their own
hand (i.e., score $+1 on the illusion statement S1), compared with
only 10% (1 out of 10) of the blind participants (Figure 2 and
Table 2). The difference in the number of affirmative scores
between the groups was significant (p= 0.011, Fisher test). Thus,
significantly more sighted than blind individuals affirmed that they
experienced the illusion. An inspection of the responses to the
control items (S2–S5) showed that both of the groups strongly
rejected the control items, which suggests that their responses to
the illusion statement were truthful.
Next, we directly compared the rated strength of the illusion
between the two groups. The sighted group showed statistically
higher rating scores than the blind group on the illusion statement
(S1) in the synchronous condition (p= 0.009, two-tailed indepen-
dent samples Mann-Whitney U test). We observed no significant
differences in the scores on the S1 statement between the groups in
the asynchronous condition (p = 0.093, two-tailed independent
samples Mann-Whitney U test). Moreover, no between-group
differences in the ratings on the 4 control statements were
observed in either the synchronous or asynchronous conditions
(S2–S5) (p.0.1 two-tailed independent samples Mann-Whitney U
test) (Figure 2). Thus, the sighted individuals reported perceiving
a stronger illusion than the blind participants did.
We also compared the strength of the illusion (as rated on S1)
between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions within
each group. Statistically, this effect of the illusion (synchronous vs.
asynchronous condition) was present only in the sighted
participants (p = 0.048, two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum test) and
was not significant for the blind subjects (p = 0.18, two-tailed
Wilcoxon rank sum test) (Figure 2).
As described in Table 2, 9 out of the 10 blind participants gave
the lowest possible rating for their experience of the illusion (23 on
statement S1). The only blind person who reported experiencing
the illusion was congenitally blind. She affirmed the illusion in the
questionnaire (+1; synchronous condition), but also affirmed
sensing the hand moving, which was one of the control statements
(+1; synchronous condition). It is noteworthy that this person had
undergone training with her parents during her childhood in
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which she was taught how to interact with objects in her
environment in a relatively free and unrestricted way. The overall
pattern of her behavior seemed to differ from the behavior of the
rest of the blind individuals in that she exhibited more proactive
and exploratory behavior.
Experiment #2: Proprioceptive drift
To complement the questionnaire results, we obtained a well-
established objective measure of the rubber hand illusion
(Experiments #2). We asked the participants to point with their
left index finger towards the felt position of their right index finger
[40]. The pre- to post-test difference measures the proprioceptive
error induced by the experimental condition. Importantly,
a greater proprioceptive drift towards the rubber hand in the
synchronous condition compared to the asynchronous condition
can be used as an objective measure of the classical [43] and non-
visual versions of the rubber hand illusion [40].
A direct comparison of the illusion-specific drift between the
groups revealed that the sighted participants displayed a greater
drift towards the rubber hand when subtracting the asynchronous
responses from the synchronous responses compared to the blind
group (significant interaction between group (blind vs. control) and
timing of stimulation (synchronous vs. asynchronous); p,0.001,
F = 18.254, mixed ANOVA).
Planned comparisons showed that the sighted participants
displayed a significantly greater (p= 0.006, two-tailed paired t-test)
proprioceptive drift towards the rubber hand in the synchronous
condition (2.2 cm62.3 cm; mean6SD) compared to the asyn-
chronous condition (0.4 cm61.5 cm; mean 6 SD). In contrast,
the blind participants did not display this illusion-specific pro-
prioceptive drift response. Instead, the blind participants showed
almost no proprioceptive drift in the synchronous condition
(0.1 cm60.8 cm; mean 6 SD), and surprisingly, a significantly
larger (p= 0.017, two-tailed paired t-test) drift towards the rubber
hand in the asynchronous condition (0.8 cm61.0 cm; mean 6
SD) (Figure 3). The unexpected drift observed in the asynchronous
condition was of a comparable magnitude to the drift demon-
strated by the sighted participants after the asynchronous
condition (p= 0.416, two-tailed unpaired t-test). It has been
demonstrated that small changes in proprioceptive drift can also
occur in the absence of changes in illusory ownership [61].
Therefore, we believe that the observed proprioceptive drift after
asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation in the blind group most
likely has no behavioral significance to the illusion under
investigation.
Figure 2. The results from the questionnaire (Experiment #1). The blind participants firmly denied the illusion statement (Statement 1; S1)
under both synchronous and asynchronous conditions (for further details, see Table 2). The participants also denied all of the control statements (S2–
S5). The sighted participants affirmed the illusion on average (S1), but only in the synchronous condition (dark gray). The percentage of participants
who affirmed the illusion and the rating of S1 in the synchronous condition were significant between the groups (p,0.05). For details about the
statistical analysis, see the Results section.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035912.g002
Table 2. Descriptive data on individual participants’ scores on the illusion statement (S1, see Figure 2).
Statement S1 (illusion) Sighted (n =12) Blind (n =10)
7-point Likert scale No. of subjectsSync (Async) Percentage Sync (Async) No. of subjects Sync (Async) Percentage Sync (Async)
+3 4 (1) 33% (8%) 0 (0) 0 (0)
+2 2 (0) 17% (0%) 0 (0) 0 (0)
+1 2 (2) 17% (17%) 1(0) 10 (0)
0 0 (0) 0% (0%) 0 (0) 0 (0)
21 0 (1) 0% (8%) 0 (0) 0 (0)
22 1 (2) 8% (17%) 0 (1) 0 (10)
23 3 (6) 25% (50%) 9 (10) 90 (90)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035912.t002
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Finally, we examined if the pointing error before the
experimental manipulation was similar between the blind and
sighted participants. Importantly, the pointing error in the pretest
condition did not differ significantly between the two groups
(p= 0.808, two-tailed unpaired t-test). This result suggests that the
sighted and blind individuals were equally capable of localizing
their hands in the setup prior to synchronous or asynchronous
visuo-tactile stimulation. Hence, the differences we observed after
the experimental conditions were likely related to differences in
illusion susceptibility rather than to differences in the ability to
perform the pointing task or in the capacity to perceive the
location of the right hand.
Experiment #3: Finger localization task to test
proprioception
In this experiment, we tested the two groups on their basic
ability to localize their right hand by relying on proprioception
alone [60]. We found no difference in the proprioceptive accuracy
between the blind and sighted participants (p = 0.41, mixed
ANOVA) (Figure 4). Consistent with previously reported results
[60], we also found a significant main effect on target location. We
found that the proprioceptive accuracy was higher for locations
close to the body than for locations far away from the body
(p= 0.005, mixed ANOVA). There was no difference in this
pattern between the blind and sighted participants, as indicated by
the non-significant interaction between target location and group
(p= 0.16, mixed ANOVA).
Discussion
In this study, we found that blind and blindfolded sighted
participants differed profoundly in their ability to experience
a non-visual version of the rubber hand illusion. Whereas the vast
majority of blind individuals appeared ‘‘immune’’ to the illusion,
sighted participants perceived a strong illusion of touching their
own hand when they were in fact touching a rubber hand,
consistent with previously published results [40] (and consistent
with versions of this illusion where sighted participants touch the
rubber hand with a paintbrush; see [62,63]). This difference
between the groups in their capacity to experience the illusion was
supported by converging data derived from the results of the
questionnaire rating scales and the manually reported proprio-
ceptive drift. More specifically, between-group comparisons
revealed that the sighted participants gave significantly higher
affirmative ratings of the illusion (p,0.05) and displayed
significantly greater proprioceptive drift towards the rubber hand
in the synchronous condition compared to the asynchronous
control (p,0.05). Furthermore, the blind participants showed
a remarkably strong denial of the illusion, with 9 out of 10
participants giving the lowest rating (23) of the illusion statement
in the questionnaires. Anecdotally, we found that most of the blind
individuals maintained this strong rejection of even a very weak
illusion response in the informal post-experiment interviews. When
asked to comment on the illusion statement, several of the blind
participants remarked that it was ‘‘totally absurd’’ or that they
‘‘could not even imagine the illusion.’’ Taken together, these
results suggest a fundamental difference in the way that tactile and
proprioceptive information from the two hands is integrated at the
central level to construct a unitary experience of one’s own two
hands in direct contact. Our interpretation is that blind individuals
do not re-map somatic signals to an external reference frame in
near-personal space as sighted people do, and therefore do not
perceptually fuse the somatic signals from their two hands into
a single event of self-touch (see further discussion below).
The fact that blind individuals were not susceptible to the
somatic rubber hand illusion could not be explained simply by
their enhanced ability to localize their hands in space. The blind
Figure 3. The results from the proprioceptive drift test, which
served as an objective measure of the illusion (Experiment
#2). As expected, the sighted individuals showed a significantly
greater drift in the perceived location of their right hand towards the
location of the rubber hand in the synchronous condition than in the
asynchronous condition (p,0.05). This illusion-specific drift towards the
rubber hand was absent in the blind group, which did not show any
drift in the synchronous condition (mixed ANOVA showed a significant
difference between groups, p,0.05). For details about the statistical
analysis, see the Results section. Synchronous conditions are color-
coded dark gray (sighted) and dark purple (blind), and the asynchro-
nous conditions light gray (sighted) and light purple (blind).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035912.g003
Figure 4. The results from the finger localization task that
tested the participants’ basic proprioceptive ability (Experi-
ment #3). The graph illustrates the perceived location of the right
index finger on the table, as indicated by the participant moving his or
her left index finger under the table. The data from the two different
groups are indicated by the different colored circles (sighted: green
circles; blind: blue circles). The red circles indicate the actual location of
the target right index finger on the table. The values on the x- and y-
axes refer to distances from the top left corner of the table in cm. There
were no significant differences between the finger-pointing responses
in the two groups (see the Results section for additional details about
the analysis).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035912.g004
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and blindfolded sighted individuals showed no significant
differences in this ability when directly tested in the bimanual
matching finger localization task (experiment #3). Furthermore,
in both groups, we reproduced a previously reported spatial
pattern of precision where hand positions closer to the shoulder
were localized more precisely than those located further away
[60]. In addition, we observed no significant differences in
‘‘baseline’’ pre-stimulation proprioceptive drift measurements
between the groups (experiment #2). Thus, although extraordi-
nary sensory abilities have been reported in the auditory and
tactile domains in blind individuals [3,11,64,65], our results do not
support the assumption that such effects are present in the
proprioceptive system for hands. Therefore, the differences in the
inducibility of the illusion between the groups can be explained
better by differences in how information from the different sensory
channels is integrated at the central level (multisensory integration)
than by differences in the unimodal processing of proprioceptive
signals. It is relevant here to point out that most of our blind
participants had received orientation and mobility training as
young children, and it is known that such training facilitates
proprioceptive-spatial discriminative ability, which could explain
why they performed at the same level as the sighted participants in
our proprioceptive tests [66].
The elicitation of the somatic rubber hand illusion is a direct
consequence of the integration of tactile and proprioceptive
information from the two hands [40]. Why would this process be
different for blind and sighted individuals? We can propose two
alternative, non-mutually exclusive explanations that are both
consistent with our data. First, blind individuals might not encode
somatosensory signals into external reference frames and therefore
not fuse the correlated tactile information from the two fingers as
sighted individuals do. Previous experiments have shown that in
sighted individuals, tactile stimuli are automatically re-mapped to
external coordinates [58,59,67] and that multisensory parietal
[50,53,55,58,68] and premotor areas [50,53,69] are likely to be
involved in this process. In contrast, congenitally blind individuals
do not seem to employ such re-mapping of tactile stimuli [17,18].
In tasks that employ temporal order judgments of tactile stimuli
that are applied to the two hands in rapid succession [59,67,70], it
has been shown that congenitally blind individuals perform better
than sighted individuals and late blinds when the hands are
crossed over the midline, suggesting that they rely more on
anatomically based information rather than a common external
coordinate system for action control and perception [17,18].
Presumably, congenitally blind individuals show reduced remap-
ping of somatosensory signals to all external coordinate systems
that are likely to be modulated by visual input, including body-
part-centered coordinates. Because the rubber hand illusion
depends on the integration of multisensory information in external
body part-centered reference frames [34,40,52,71,72], a reduced
general ability to employ tactile re-mapping to external coordinate
systems in the blind could explain their inability to experience the
illusion.
An alternative interpretation is that touch and proprioception
are weighted differently in blind and sighted individuals. In the
classic model of multisensory integration, the integration process is
conceptualized as resulting from a linear summation of signals
obtained from two or more modalities, where each signal is
weighted according to its reliability [73]. This idea is conserved in
contemporary probabilistic models of multisensory integration,
albeit with the caveat that the ‘‘weighing’’ can vary dynamically
depending on the context [74–76]. In our paradigm, a greater
weight given to proprioceptive information from the hands and
arms should work against the illusion, as the spatial discrepancy
between the two hands would be maintained and the correlated
tactile signals ‘‘ignored.’’ In contrast, a greater weighing of touch
should work in favor of the illusion, as it is the detection of the
spatially and temporally congruent tactile signals that drives the
illusion. As discussed above, the two groups revealed no difference
in their basic ability to localize their right index finger in space,
which speaks against possible differences in the weighing of
proprioception. Although we did not measure tactile acuity in this
study, there is an ample amount of published evidence that
suggests that blind individuals have a superior spatial and temporal
tactile discriminative ability (see below). Thus, if anything, one
would expect greater weighing of touch in the blind group, which
presumably would have intensified the illusion. Our findings are
better explained by a model in which the lack of illusory self-touch
in blind individuals is attributed to a reduced ability to integrate
tactile and proprioceptive information from the two hands into
a common external reference frame in the peripersonal space [40].
After this analysis of multisensory models, it is important to also
carefully consider the possibility that the lack of an illusion in the
blind could be simply accounted for by superior tactile processing
[64,77,78] (i.e., by differences in unisensory tactile processing). All
of our blind participants were Braille readers, and it is known that
Braille readers show greater tactile acuity in their fingertips than
individuals who do not read Braille [78]. Thus, it could be that
blind individuals are more sensitive to incongruence in the texture
between the rubber hand and their own hand. To quote an
anonymous reviewer, ‘‘the rubber hand might feel too fake to be
part of their own body.’’ Although we cannot exclude this
possibility, we are nevertheless of the opinion that this is not a likely
explanation because of three relevant aspects of tactile processing
that could conceivably affect the rubber hand illusion: (i)
perception of roughness or texture (also referred to as micro-
geometry of the object); (ii) the ability to perceive surface curvature
that underlies shape perception (i.e., the macrogeometric proper-
ties of the object); and (iii) the temporal perception of the relative
timing of the tactile stimuli. With respect to the first point, we
know that the rubber hand illusion is insensitive to differences in
texture, and that it can be induced under conditions of
substantially greater mismatch in texture than in our current
experiments [63,79]. Indeed, during the somatic rubber hand
illusion, participants typically perceived (and spontaneously
remarked on) the unnatural texture, temperature and stiffness of
the rubber hand, but, nevertheless, were able to incorporate these
tactile percepts into their experience of touching their own hand.
Furthermore, all of the participants in our study wore plastic
surgical gloves on both hands, which reduced the perceived
differences in texture. Second, both groups received identical prior
knowledge that they were touching a rubber hand and were able
to recognize the shape of the rubber finger. Although we know
that the rubber hand illusion breaks down when the participant
sees or touches an object that does not resemble a human hand at
all (like a block of wood [39] or a rectangular dish brush [40]), it is
unlikely that the putative better shape perception of blind
individuals would change their object perception so dramatically
that they would no longer perceive it as an object shaped like
a finger. In addition, it is important to note that the empirical
support for the assumption that blind individuals have a superior
ability to haptically recognize the shape of objects is mixed (as
reviewed by [80]). Third, although experimental data have shown
that the congenitally blind have a superior capacity to detect the
relative timing of tactile stimuli delivered to the two hands (for
example, 23 ms for the congenitally blind compared to 47 ms in
sighted individuals [17]), we think that it is unlikely that this
difference can explain our results. First, great care was taken by
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a highly trained experimenter to administer the touches as
synchronously as possible. Second, the touch stimuli involved
stroking the finger along a continuous 2-to3-cm path length. This
mode of stimulation provides a strong spatial cue for congruence
that would not depend on the fine-grained temporal resolution of
tactile perception. Third, the classical and somatic rubber hand
illusions are quite robust to subtle violations in synchrony
(anecdotal observations), and the classical visual rubber hand
illusion can be maintained with inter-sensory delays as long as
300 ms under certain experimental conditions [81]. Finally, none
of the blind participants remarked that the touches were
asynchronous (in the illusion condition) when they were asked in
the post-experiment interviews to speculate about why the illusion
did not work.
What do these findings tell us about the rubber hand illusion as
a model system to study body ownership? It has been proposed
that the rubber hand illusion can be explained in terms of the
integration of visual, tactile and proprioceptive information
[34,41,43]. This idea has been extended to models where
perceived changes in ownership during the illusion are linked to
the integration of multisensory information into body-part-
centered reference frames [34,48,49]. Similarly, models that
maintain the feeling of ownership as a higher-order cognitive
process distinct from multisensory integration mechanisms never-
theless emphasize that ‘‘recalibration of visual and tactile
coordinates and the referral of touch’’ are mandatory early-stage
components of the embodiment process [82]. Thus, under the
assumption that the lack of normal visual experience during
childhood leads to a reduced multisensory representation of the
upper limbs in peripersonal space, our current finding that blind
participants appear ‘‘immune’’ to the somatic rubber hand illusion
supports multisensory models of body ownership [48,49,82].
Our results have left one important question unanswered: how
do blind individuals experience ownership of their body? In
psychology, there is a long-standing tradition of studying illusions
to learn more about the mechanisms that mediate normal
perception. Thus, the experience of the rubber hand illusion in
the sighted group informs us about the mechanisms of ownership
in sighted individuals. However, the lack of an illusion in the blind
group does not directly inform us about the mechanisms that
produce ownership in blind individuals. Although a multisensory
integration mechanism, albeit in altered form (e.g., in terms of
reference frames or ‘weighing,’ as discussed above), may still be the
most likely candidate mechanism for body ownership, more
studies are needed to clarify the exact nature of such self-
attribution processes in the blind. For example, future studies
should test if body illusions that presumably do not depend on
external coordinates, such as tendon vibration illusions [83], can
be elicited in blind participants. It would also be very interesting to
examine the potential role of auditory cues in the self-identification
of limbs, which might be more important for blind individuals,
given that auditory stimuli are also represented in the body-part-
centered reference frames in space near the body [36,57,84].
A limitation of the design of this study is that we did not conduct
a direct comparison between congenitally blind and late-blind
individuals. Thus, we were not able to directly test the role of early
critical periods during development in the elicitation of the rubber
hand illusion [16]. Our blind participants were either congenitally
blind (n = 5) or had severe visual impairments in childhood before
the onset of adult blindness (n = 5) (see Table 1). It should be noted
that there appeared to be no systematic difference in the
questionnaire scores or proprioceptive drift responses between
the congenitally blind participants and those who had severely
impaired vision from birth when we inspected the data using
a descriptive approach. Because all of our blind participants
demonstrated severely disturbed developmental vision (no func-
tional vision), we can infer substantial structural and functional
plasticity in their multisensory brain systems [12,13], including
a likely reduced ability to employ an external reference frame for
localizing somatosensory signals [17,18].
In conclusion, our results suggest that blindness with disturbed
developmental vision precludes the elicitation of the somatic
rubber hand illusion. This finding suggests the existence of
fundamental differences in central body representation between
blind and sighted individuals. Specifically, our results suggest that
blind individuals with impaired developmental vision have a less
dynamic multisensory representation of their own limbs. We can
only speculate about the consequences of this ‘‘less plastic’’ body
representation for behavioral and cognitive functions. However, it
is worth reflecting on a potential link to the characteristic cautious,
slow and less explorative movement pattern of the blind [85]. If we
conceptualize near-personal space as a special zone that surrounds
the body, which is used not only to encode multisensory limb
positions in external coordinates but also to facilitate object-
directed and defensive actions [51,52,86–90], then a reduced near-
personal space representation in the blind could explain both their
inability to experience the somatic rubber hand illusion and their
overall reduced mobility and cautious explorative movements.
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